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Review Essay*1
The Search for a Plural America: 




A crisis of authority defines modernity. The crisis in the Christian West dates to the 
Reformation and the church-and-state conflicts based upon the question: whose 
Christianity? The crisis deepened during the Enlightenment as advances in science, 
reason, and technology changed the question: Christianity or not? By the 1960s, 
post-structuralism or postmodernity had posed the very question of authority and 
asserted competing authorities.
Out of the first two crises, America was born. Shaped by the forces of a plural 
Christian West and the Enlightenment, the founders constructed a nation steeped 
in the assumptions of both faith and reason. They balanced these authorities by 
disestablishing religion, providing for its free exercise, and creating three branches 
of government to obstruct runaway power. 
For George Marsden, Francis A. McAnaney Professor Emeritus at the University 
of Notre Dame, the marriage of liberal Protestantism and Enlightenment principles 
held the country together for nearly two hundred years. In his The Twilight of 
the American Enlightenment: The 1950s and the Crisis of Liberal Belief (2013), 
Marsden argues that in the mid-twentieth century this formula began to fail. He 
* George Marsden, The Twilight of the American Enlightenment: The 1950s and the Crisis of 
Liberal Belief (New York: Basic Books, 2013). 264 pp. $26.99 hb.
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locates that failure in a liberal Protestantism that adapted to secular reason and 
became a loose approximation of the Christian faith. That left the Enlightenment 
as the proprietor of American public life and created the impression of increasing 
secularization. 
These cultural riptides grew stronger in the 1960s. God was dead, a president and 
his brother were dead, Martin Luther King, Jr. was dead, citizens on American streets 
set ablaze by race riots were dead, and tens of thousands of Americans in Vietnam 
were dead. These events shook the American liberal Protestant-Enlightenment 
consensus. Women, blacks, gays, a secular left, a counterculture youth, and a new 
Christian right protested that the consensus had never been consensual.
These left turns and right turns spawned a set of culture wars that have dominated 
public life for the past five decades. For Marsden, these wars endured because 
neither liberal Protestantism nor conservative evangelical Protestantism nor the 
Enlightenment proved adequate for a plural America. 
Weary of the fight, Marsden proposes an alternative approach to how we can live 
together. His plan for détente draws on the life and thought of Dutch theologian-
statesman Abraham Kuyper (1837–1920). Kuyper was a force of nature. From the 
pastorate, he formed a new denomination of the Reformed church, co-founded a 
university, and established a political party. His political activity won him a seat 
in parliament and eventually the office of prime minister. In all of these activities, 
Kuyper recognized that religious and secular viewpoints not only coexisted but 
also would have to cooperate. To foster cooperation he argued, as Marsden notes, 
“that no one stands on neutral ground.” Scientists and believers alike operated from 
non-objective “highest commitments.”12According to Marsden, Kuyper’s orthodox 
Christianity plus his clear vision of competing religious and secular truths models an 
instructive pluralism. It avoids the liberal Protestant accommodation of modernity, 
the false universalism of Enlightenment thought, and the knee-jerk absolutism of 
conservative evangelicalism. 
Where Marsden sees a problem in the marriage of liberal Protestantism and the 
Enlightenment, atheist David Hollinger in After Cloven Tongues of Fire: Protestant 
Liberalism in Modern American History (2013) sees a solution. Hollinger, 
Preston Hotchkis Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley, 
celebrates liberal Protestantism’s adaptation to modern knowledge. The union of 
Enlightenment values and liberal belief realized the idealism of a free, equal, and 
protected society. For Hollinger, liberal Protestantism’s waning influence in the 
contemporary moment is hardly an event to be mourned. They “won,” after all, 
delivering America to greater inclusivity and opportunity and an Enlightenment 
sensibility to sustain these freedoms. 
Mark Grief’s The Age of the Crisis of Man: Thought and Fiction in America, 
1933–1973 (2015) joins Marsden’s and Hollinger’s commendable treatments of the 
fusions and fissures of the Christian-Enlightenment story in America. For Grief, 
1 Marsden, Twilight of the American Enlightenment, 168-69.
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who is an assistant professor of literary studies at the New School, the common 
theme for post-World War II intellectuals and novelists was a shared scrutiny of 
the American consensus couched in anxiety about the nature, the direction, and 
the proper ideology of humanity. The anxiety generated what he calls a “maieutic” 
discourse, a static conversation stuck in grandiose abstractions. In the case of 
postwar intellectual culture, thinkers of the era raised big questions and poignant, 
if generalized, observations about “man” but delivered nothing more.  
Marsden thinks they delivered a little more than Grief but they were the last group 
of intellectuals to operate under the liberal Protestant-Enlightenment consensus. 
Since that time, however, he contends, “there is no one standard, underlying set 
of assumptions, including beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality and values, 
that all rational educated people can somehow be presumed to share.”23In a world 
like this, Marsden wants his Augustinian brand of Christianity treated equally 
in public life as a source of authority. Others, he acknowledges, will prefer 
another faith tradition or no faith tradition. To his mind, however, Enlightenment 
ideology dominates public life and merely tolerates Christian perspectives. The 
situation is ironic. The Enlightenment valuing of critical reason has augmented the 
fragmentation of authority, but its champions, Hollinger among them, often insist 
on it as the authority. 
Apart from this ironic predicament, Marsden’s first chapters question the 
Enlightenment’s strength for organizing modern life at all. In this section, he 
surveys a range of thinkers—among them David Riesman, James Baldwin, Walter 
Whyte, Erich Fromm, Walter Lippmann, and Reinhold Niebuhr—to illustrate the 
1950s scrutiny of and dissatisfaction with its Protestant-Enlightenment heritage. 
These thinkers shared grave concerns about the supposed 1950s religious revival 
and the concurrent commercialism, scientism, and instrumentalism of modern life. 
To them, these organizing principles provided no real glue or common purpose 
for American society. Instead, they found a shallow culture producing reflexive 
citizens who appeared to be too conformist, on the one hand, or too individualistic, 
on the other, or lost between these two poles. But, for Marsden, they offered no 
real alternative to the modern dilemma.
Their solutions sputtered, but Marsden appreciates their diagnosis of modernity’s 
implications for American society. Lippmann’s A Preface to Morals (1929) stands 
out within this field as the finest precursor to Marsden’s worry about authority 
and pluralism. In a brilliant piece of writing, Lippmann argues that the “acids 
of modernity”—science, urbanization, and pluralism—burned away the staying 
power of liberal and conservative Protestantism. Lippmann  further contends that 
the modern conditions that reduced transcendent belief to ashes are, however, no 
substitute for how we ought to live together. 
2 Ibid., xxviii.
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With religion discredited and no modern replacement for its edifying and unifying 
power, Lippmann asks, now what? In an observation no less relevant in 2015 than 
1929, Lippmann writes, “[the modern man] finds it hard to believe that doing any 
one thing is better than doing any other thing, or, in fact, that it is better than doing 
nothing at all.” Modern man may not believe in any “theory of the meaning and 
value of events,” yet “he is none the less compelled to accept the events” without 
a “moral authority.” The problem is clear: “how mankind, deprived of the great 
fictions, is to come to terms with the needs which created those fictions.”324His 
observations bedevil Preface to Morals and haunt contemporary America. 
This aimlessness unsettles Lippmann as does the prospect of Americans forming 
so many individualized authorities. He proposes a disinterested and universal 
humanism to fill the moral authority void. Few would contend Lippmann succeeded. 
Among others, Daniel Rodgers’s Age of Fracture (2011) shows how, through the 
late twentieth century, particularism surged in American life. This trend “toward 
disaggregation” starves a nation hungry for connection and common purpose, 
something Lippmann anticipated and feared.445 
Midcentury thinkers offered variations of Lippmann’s “acids of modernity” 
thesis and, according to Grief, created the “age of the crisis of man.” Their focal 
point, Grief argues, led nowhere. The frenzied concern about the state of man 
under what they understood to be the corrosive effects of technology and the 
unfulfilled promise of the Enlightenment became the tired refrain of the age. Grief 
calls it an “empty discourse” that ends in “unanswerability.” The always elusive, 
unhelpful, and abstract question “what is man?” created intellectual stagnation. 
Typical of the age were psychoanalysts Erich Fromm’s Man for Himself  (1947) 
and Karl Menninger’s Man against Himself (1956). Titles like these evoke Grief’s 
“unanswerabiltiy” and his concern that the “age of the crisis of man” was a futile 
moment of intellectual hand-wringing.536 
Grief groups these midcentury assessments of man under the term “re-
enlightenment.” He defines it not as a revival or “Second Enlightenment” but a 
loose confederation of intellectuals intent on a “humbler effort to restore the project 
of human liberation . . . without the grandiosity or vulnerability of the earlier age’s 
vision.”67Arbiters of this re-enlightenment could be religious or not and tilt toward 
or away from the Enlightenment. 
3 Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Morals (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989) 
4, 9, 144; Marsden, Twilight of the American Enlightenment, 50. 
4 Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2011) 5.
5 Mark Grief, The Age of Crisis of Man: Thought and Fiction in America, 1933–1973 (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015) 12, 316–30. Throughout this article, the non-inclusive male 
pronoun “man” appears. This is an exception to Harvard Theological Review’s preference for 
inclusive language. The exception granted here corresponds to Grief’s title and usage as well as 
the immediate post-World War II context where the use of “man” predominated.
6 Ibid., 23.
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Grief’s re-enlightenment is Marsden’s twilight of the Enlightenment. Marsden, 
like Grief, notes that thinkers of that era offered no genuine alternative to the 
modern reorientation of life in the twentieth century. They were moderates who 
“had no solutions beyond more of the same,” a chastened consensus about the 
value of science, reason, individualism, and progress for American equilibrium.758 
Both Marsden and Grief want out of the impasse. Marsden opts for Kuyperianism. 
Grief simply wants out. In Grief’s view, for all its intelligence, midcentury 
intellectual culture amounted to so many theories of man dancing on the head of a 
pin. This discourse of “the crisis of man,” severed from actual sayings and doings 
of humans, restricted thought to an ethereal intellectual prison. 
Grief fears contemporary scholarship is still locked down. The present infatuation 
with “posts”—postmodernism, posthumanism, post-secularism, and post-history—
expresses a false urgency and similarly narrows inquiry by the fact that they “are 
all parts of the same thing.” Beyond the “posts,” he argues that climate change 
follows the inhibiting crisis rhetoric and method. Grand discussions about climate 
change occur, but they are no more than that. They spur us to inaction, satisfied 
that we have thought about the big problems of self and society.869 
Grief’s encyclopedic survey of the discourse of man ends in his own declaration 
of a crisis about the crisis of man. He orders such inquiry to “Stop!” Instead of 
theories of man, Grief advocates for the practices of man. Scholars should analyze 
and answer “questions of concrete value . . . and find the immediate actions 
necessary to achieve an aim.”9710Grief’s new command is John Dewey’s old one.
Marsden’s book begins where Grief’s ends. His review of postwar intellectual 
stasis serves as a long preface—perhaps too long—to his real aim: criticism of 
liberal and conservative Protestant accommodation of the Enlightenment and 
their failed religious pluralism. Overall, both traditions accepted their American 
Enlightenment birthright. And like family members they expressed their common 
ancestry differently and antagonistically. Liberal Protestants deferred to advances in 
natural science—evolution and geological time—and to social scientific approaches 
to the history of Christianity and the Bible. Conservative Protestants rejected those 
aspects of modern thought in favor of sola scriptura, but they adopted modern 
notions of individualism, free-market capitalism, and American exceptionalism. 
For Marsden, they each conceded too much of Christianity to the Enlightenment, 
and then they took out their differences on each other. 
7 Marsden, Twilight of the American Enlightenment, xvi.
8 Grief, The Age of the Crisis of Man, 316–30.
9 Ibid., 328.
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Marsden tells his story of liberal Protestantism through the life and career of 
theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. Hollinger does the same. Their respective spotlights 
on Niebuhr join a decade-long cascade of scholarly and mainstream references to 
the theologian’s legacy. With few exceptions, the attention caricatures Niebuhr. 
Both Marsden and Hollinger follow the rule, not the exception.10811
Marsden splits his opinion of Niebuhr. He credits Niebuhr for criticizing 
Enlightenment overestimations of the power of science, reason, and technology 
to solve complex social and political problems. Ultimately, however, he dismisses 
Niebuhr as a representative of a “generalized Christianity” that granted too much 
authority to natural science and “offered little to challenge most of the secularizing 
trends that he himself identified.”11912 
Marsden bases his interpretation of Niebuhr upon a conventional “atheists 
for Niebuhr” argument. On this view, admiration and appropriation of Niebuhr 
by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and other so-called “atheists for Niebuhr,” questions 
the Christian character of his work. If atheists could adopt Niebuhr’s criticism of 
American self-righteousness and drop his Christianity, the reasoning goes, then 
Christianity must be non-essential to his thought. 
The existence of “atheists for Niebuhr” says less about Niebuhr and more about 
Schlesinger and company. Hollinger stresses this point in Cloven Tongues. He 
notes that Morton White, the Harvard philosopher who coined the phrase, meant 
it disapprovingly. White could not understand how there could be any such thing 
as an “atheist for Niebuhr” given, as Hollinger puts it, the “God and Jesus talk” 
that underpinned Niebuhr’s thought.121013 
Hollinger’s rejection of the “atheists for Niebuhr” argument is not a defense 
of the theologian. It is a prelude to a bigger target—Niebuhr as such. Cloven 
Tongues concludes by censuring Niebuhr as simultaneously too Christian and not 
Christian enough. On the former count, Hollinger criticizes what he calls Niebuhr’s 
sectarianism, which privileged Christianity as the ultimate source of truth. This 
curious analysis begs the question: Would Hollinger fault a secularist for privileging 
secular thought? On the latter count, Hollinger, like Marsden, regards Niebuhr as 
a liberal Protestant who “was indeed more worldly, more secular” than most of 
his ecumenical contemporaries and consequently facilitated secularization more 
than he challenged it.1314 
Hollinger pushes this second argument too far. He implies that Niebuhr did not 
believe much of what he said about Christianity and its relevance for the modern 
world. “Might Niebuhr have always retained,” writes Hollinger, some “suspicion 
10 The late John Patrick Diggins argued Niebuhr’s legacy “continues to be misconstrued in the 
service of flawed political ends,” and he insisted that Niebuhr “was a realist because he was religious” 
(John Patrick Diggins, Why Niebuhr Now? [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011] 5, 71).
11 Marsden, Twilight of the American Enlightenment, xxvi, 118–22.
12 David Hollinger, After Cloven Tongues of Fire: Protestant Liberalism in Modern American 
History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013) 213.
13 Ibid., 220.
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that the Christian project could only do so much for humankind?” His Christian 
generalizations “could provide a religious cover . . . a way of holding onto the faith 
for a while longer, enabling it to do what good it could, but not actually asking it 
to do very much.”141115 
These conjectures feed Hollinger’s claim that no “Protestant intellectual of 
his time was more proud than Reinhold Niebuhr of his worldly wisdom.”151216As 
evidence, Hollinger cites Niebuhr’s biblical epigraph in The Children of the Light 
and the Children of Darkness (1944). The quotation taken from Luke 16:8 reads, 
“The children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light.” 
Hollinger interprets Niebuhr as “a child of this world, and of his generation.” No 
doubt he was a child of his generation—everyone is—but Hollinger misinterprets 
Niebuhr’s use of this quotation. 
Niebuhr interprets the children of the light as naïve liberals who overestimate 
human innocence and goodwill. He defines the children of this world as children 
of darkness, the moral cynics of history who are “wise, though evil, because 
they understand the power of self-interest.”1617For the rest of the book, Niebuhr 
inveighs against children of light (sentimental optimists) and children of darkness 
(pessimistic cynics). 
Marsden’s and Hollinger’s Niebuhrian digressions unnecessarily dampen their 
arguments. Marsden’s ultimate dismissal of Niebuhr, even if some of his criticisms 
are warranted, cuts off a domestic resource for his Kuyperian argument. For his 
part, Hollinger may have reasonable grounds to question Niebuhr’s negotiation 
between Christianity and secularism, but his speculations reduce to ad hominem. 
If Marsden and Hollinger share a perspective on Niebuhr, they also agree that 
conservative evangelicalism fails as a constructive contribution to American public 
life. Hollinger does not dwell on this point, but it is a clear assumption of his 
text.1718For his part, Marsden reprimands Christian right-wingers who uncritically 
champion America as a Christian nation. This vision, past and present, ignores 
the evangelical synthesis of Christianity with American Enlightenment values of 
“self determination, and free enterprise” and degenerates into us-them rhetoric that 
divides America into “Christian” and “non-Christian.” Conservative Christians of 
this type, Marsden points out, have been unable to follow a foundational precept 




16 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of 
Democracy and A Critique of Its Traditional Defense (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944) 10.
17 Hollinger, Cloven Tongues, 39, chs. 8 and 9. 
18 Marsden, Twilight of the American Enlightenment, 149, 150; see also, 144–48.
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Having established that religious pluralism suffers in the hands of both liberal 
and conservative American Protestants, Marsden turns to the distinctive religious-
political career of Abraham Kuyper. Marsden begins his account of Kuyper by 
noting the significant differences between Kuyper’s Dutch context and that of the 
twenty-first century US. The Netherlands differed dramatically from the US by its 
homogeneity, multi-party political system, and comfort with hierarchical authority. 
These contrasts, he argues, offer a framework for rethinking the American approach 
to pluralism. Yet the disparities Marsden offers, including America’s diversity, two-
party stranglehold, and extreme discomfort with hierarchy, raise too many questions 
about the relevance of a Kuyperian model of religious pluralism for America. 
Marsden’s Kuyperian alternative survives these differences in one respect. 
Kuyper’s significance for America lies in his anticipation of the postmodern world 
of competing narratives. Marsden summarizes, “Kuyper insisted that reason, 
natural science, and methodological naturalism were not ideologically neutral 
. . . [they] operated within the framework of the faith, or higher commitments, of 
the practitioner.”1920In other words, like Kuyper, the postmodern world treats—in 
theory, anyway—all positions as normative expressions, “higher commitments,” 
that dictate how life ought to be led.
Marsden practices what Kuyper preaches. At the outset of the book, he discloses 
his “Augustinian Christian” perspective and hopes it provides for constructive 
dialogue with those who do not share it. Such “frank recognition of differences” 
between the ultimate commitments of the religious and irreligious, he argues, will 
open up “understandings and insights that we can hold in common.”2021Without 
this honest recognition of the normative bias of all viewpoints, Marsden contends, 
pluralism will languish and religious voices will remain unjustifiably “second class” 
in modern public discourse.211722
Marsden is correct that there is nothing “second class” about religion. His 
straightforward assertion of the ultimate concerns and normative claims all people 
make about and upon reality is welcome and refreshing. We are, to extend a phrase 
from biblical scholar Walter Brueggemann, “selective fundamentalists” in the truths 
we hold and advance for others to follow. Still, Marsden somehow misses that 
American Christians wield first-class power in contemporary America. Presidents, 
let alone most elected officials, cannot win office without a Christian testimonial. As 
Hollinger notes, “Christianity continues to be the cultural norm, not the exception, 
in the United States.”2223On this point, Hollinger settles the issue. 
19 Ibid., 165.
20 Ibid., xxix.
21 Ibid., 175; see also, Robin Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995) ch. 1. 
22 Hollinger, Cloven Tongues, 198. 
152 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
Hollinger knows he is not without a norm. Like Kuyper, but more like Peter 
Novick,2324Hollinger ruminates on how the subjective impacts “objective” inquiry. 
In an autobiographical essay recounting his Anabaptist heritage and subsequent 
atheism at Berkeley, Hollinger asks: “When does a personal frame enable a historian 
to see historical realities that others might not see, and when does it become, 
instead, a bias?”2425
It is not a matter of when but how a personal frame influences a vision of 
reality. All positions carry an “ideological taint.” Scores of thinkers, from James 
Madison to Karl Marx to Reinhold Niebuhr, have observed the “impurity” and 
rationalizations of human thought. Madison put the matter succinctly: “As long 
as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and 
his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other.”2526Thomas Kuhn, an 
author both Hollinger and Marsden cite, understood this from another angle. He 
established that paradigms shift and so do we.
No one avoids thinking their position, their orthodoxy, is less tainted than 
another. Marsden and Hollinger are no different, nor should they be. For Marsden, 
it is Augustinian-Kuyperian Christianity. For Hollinger, it is secular reason via the 
Enlightenment. 
They may have their preferences, but also they know of the interdependence and 
mutual benefit of Christianity and the Enlightenment in modern Western history. 
With that lineage, writes Hollinger, individuals in the West fall along the continuum 
of faith and reason as “a matter of degree and emphasis.”2627
Those degrees and emphases matter, and they are the stuff of conflict. Hollinger 
wants no part of Kuyperian pluralism. He has had “enough already” of arguments—
like Marsden’s—that treat scientific thought as “one of a number of ‘paradigms.’ ” 
He resists such paradigmatic equality, especially on university campuses, for three 
reasons. First, Christianity cannot furnish proper evidence for its claims. Second, 
it has a history of evils. Third, Christian scholars emphasize moral formation too 
much and disciplinary content too little.2728
Hollinger’s objections do little more than submit faith to the reason side of the 
continuum. These understandable, if conventional, arguments lead, to borrow from 
Grief, nowhere. They are easily questioned and reversed. Twenty-first-century 
Enlightenment philosophes—from the natural sciences to the social sciences—have 
drunk deeply from the Kool-Aid of evidence. The evidence that counts, moreover, 
is evidence based on Enlightenment standards. These standards are important, the 
23 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical 
Profession (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
24 Hollinger, Cloven Tongues, 170. 
25 James Madison, Federalist #10, Constitution Society, accessed November 16, 2015, http://
www.constitution.org/fed/federa10.htm.
26 Hollinger, Cloven Tongues, 14.
27 Ibid., ch. 9.
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best we have on certain subjects and arenas of life, but they hardly give a full picture 
of reality. For instance, the standards automatically discount Christian “evidence.” 
They also discount those who believe that Christianity is not based on evidence. 
Empirical evidence, of course, is the opposite of faith. 
The “evils” of the Protestant hegemony are real. Christianity has much to answer 
for and apologize for. But so too does the secular Enlightenment. On the one hand, 
the typical allusion to two thousand years of Christian violence and oppression 
stands as evidence for its good riddance. On the other hand, an account of violence 
and oppression rooted in Enlightenment thought—all the more troubling for its 
shorter duration—stands as evidence for its good riddance.2829This scorecard history 
ends in unhelpful “better or worse” arguments and leads, as Marsden knows, to 
culture wars. 
Hollinger’s third concern about the sacrifice of content for formation recalls 
Max Weber’s classic “Science as a Vocation.” Weber warns against “the prophet 
and the demagogue”2930in the lecture hall. It is a fair and important warning, and 
neither Marsden nor Hollinger would endorse such overt punditry—be it from 
Christian or Enlightenment sources. 
Yet formation occurs on university campuses. It happens through student affairs 
divisions and classrooms governed by the modern Enlightenment methods that 
deliver content. But what is that content? For student affairs, it turns on social 
scientific views of leadership, community service, and inclusivity. The classroom 
prizes, with some variation, instrumentalism, deconstruction, and individualism. 
Weber was fine with that. “The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization 
and intellectualization, and above all, ‘disenchantment of the world.’ ”3031Hollinger 
is fine with that too. 
Most students are not. They come from or want something more. They enroll 
at thousands of universities, even Berkeley, under the influence of Christianity or 
another religious system. Many of those without a religious background arrive on 
campus with big existential questions haunting them. Disenchanting content that 
“frees” the individual from tradition and toward cosmopolitanism addresses few 
of these concerns.3132
28 The realities and horrors of Leninism-Stalinism, Maoism, modern racism, eugenics, and 
exploitative capitalism come to mind. 
29 Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (ed. H. H. 
Gerth and C. Wright Mills; New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) 129–56, 146.
30 Ibid., 155.
31 Tim Clydesdale, The Purposeful Graduate: Why Colleges Must Talk to Students about Vocation 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015).
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Marsden does not object to the presence of these formative sources per se but 
wonders why we are satisfied with formation on modernity’s terms alone. He 
effectively asks: why not cosmopolitanism inclusive of religious sensibilities? 
Marsden might have referenced the work of Jürgen Habermas here. Failing a more 
inclusive cosmopolitanism such as Habermas’s, the Enlightenment conception 
of modern life begs major questions: freedom toward what? deconstruction? 
mindfulness? consumerism? individualism? 
Fifty years ago, sociologist Phillip Rieff asked similar questions in his book 
The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith After Freud (1966). In his study, he 
analyzes the Enlightenment-secular culture as a new moral demand system with a 
therapeutic ethic. Such a culture, he argues, placed the mental and physical comfort 
of the self at its center, creating generations born “to be pleased,” uncommitted and 
uninhibited. It was Lippmann’s diagnosis three decades later. 
Rieff’s dismay about the cultural revolution of midcentury exemplifies Marsden’s 
and Grief’s reviews of midcentury intellectuals. He joins the diagnosticians of 
American life who offer no alternatives. Rieff claims nothing more for his account 
of the new culture. Still, he did not like what he saw, and his observations sound 
eerily familiar. He wonders about the stability of a society “when its members must 
stimulate themselves to feverish activity in order to demonstrate how alive they are 
. . . vacillating between dead purposes and deadly devices to escape boredom.” This 
Enlightenment-therapeutic culture was indeed a “new religiosity.” His observations 
about it, although offered five decades ago, cut to the bone of a selfie culture with 
earbuds in, scrolling through a screen, guided by bucket lists, big data, TED talks, 
and one thing after another. Rieff worried then, and would certainly worry now, 
about Americans shaped by religions of the self. He thought the therapeutic-infused 
Enlightenment produced knowers without authority or wisdom.3233 
Marsden, Hollinger, and Grief worry no less than Rieff. They worry because 
they understand that competing orthodoxies, which are competing worries, shape 
history. Marsden worries about what counts as authority. Hollinger worries America 
has too many Christians claiming too much authority and wisdom. Grief worries 
scholars abstract authority and wisdom into a discourse of oughts, “manifestos and 
credos, papers of declaration and prophecy, objurgations and reverences,” which 
ends in a still life of humanity.3334 
My worry for America originates in Christian suspicion of our culture. My late 
father, a Lutheran pastor in the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, taught me 
that ideologies, Christian, Enlightenment, and beyond, rarely produce trustworthy 
authority or wisdom. This view originates from the human tendency to ascribe too 
32 Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith After Freud (Wilmington, DE: 
ISI Books, 2006) 8, 208. 
33 Grief, The Age of the Crisis of Man, 330.
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much authority to the self: to treat the self as a god. He owed this perspective, as I 
do, to Augustine, Luther, Kierkegaard, Niebuhr, Becker, and so many more—not 
least of all the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. 
King features prominently, if briefly, in Marsden’s, Hollinger’s, and Grief’s 
studies. Marsden applauds King’s synthesis of Christian belief and America’s 
founding ideals. Why he prefers Kuyper to King is never clear. He intimates that 
King’s vision of pluralism died with him, and the rights conversations following 
his assassination splintered along lines of race, gender, and sexual orientation. But 
that is not King’s fault.
Hollinger uses King to frame his book. Similarly to Marsden, he cites King as 
an example of Protestant Christianity and the Enlightenment. King then becomes 
Hollinger’s foil for his own theme. He suggests, “not everyone . . . understands 
the relation between the two [Christianity and Enlightenment] in quite the same 
terms. And there are others who have depicted the relation as one of deep tension, 
even hostility.”3435This may be true, but it is not King’s fault. 
For Grief, King’s gravity owed much to Niebuhr. The theologian’s doctrine of 
man leavened King’s optimism and “furnish[ed] a realism and a sort of fortitude 
in confrontation with the depths of depravity of black Americans’ segregationist 
opponents.” At the same time, King authenticated Niebuhr. He applied and lived 
Niebuhr’s thought during an all too real “crisis of man.” Grief makes these 
observations and moves on, dropping King in as a prophetic representation of the 
discourse of man.3536
King’s public work and ministry is much more than a preface to identity politics 
or tensions between Christianity and the Enlightenment or an admirable contribution 
to the “age of the crisis of man.” Rather, his civil rights work intersected with the 
worst and best of Christianity, the Enlightenment, and humanity. King and his 
fellow African Americans suffered violent racism by the thoughts and actions 
of humans who justified their cause on the basis of Christian and Enlightenment 
precepts. King and the movement also applied ideas from these same traditions 
that accelerated their liberation. 
In the end, King’s careful negotiation of Christianity, the Enlightenment, and 
the value of “man” brought a historic breakthrough for freedom and pluralism. 
His triumph owed more to Christian authority. Drawing on the doctrine of original 
sin and Niebuhr, King believed all humans found a way to abuse one another 
individually and collectively.3637In short, humanity was the problem—Christian, 
Enlightened, and otherwise. What could be more plural than that? 
34 Hollinger, Cloven Tongues, 2–3, 202.
35 Grief, The Age of The Crisis of Man, 262–263.
36 Martin Luther King, Jr., “The Drum Major Instinct,” in A Testament of Hope: The Essential 
Writings And Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr. (ed. James M. Washington; San Francisco: Harper 
Collins, 1986), 259–267.
